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the debt-eguity ratio significantly affects the investuent demands
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P&Eand R&D investmentarequitesimilarinthe short run.
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The extent to which a firm's capital structure influences
capital accumulation has long been a contested theoretical and empirical
issue. On the theoretical side work by Stiglitz [21], King [15],
Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski [8], Auerbach [2] and Brock and
Turnovsky [4] has investigated how alternative financing sources affect
the capital stick selected by the firm. However, in these papers it
is assumed that the capital stock can be intantaneously adjusted so
that capital is treated as a variable factor of production.
There is another view (see Lucas [17], Gould [10], Nussa [19]
and Treadway [24]) which postulates that the process of capital
accumulation involves the firm incurring adjustment costs. In this
framework capital is not instantly variable but rather it is a quasi—
fixed factor, which is altered by the investment decisions. Investment
functions are generated, which are increasing functions of the demand
price of installed capital.
In this paper, by integrating the two approaches, we are able to
analyze the influence that the capital structure exerts on investment
undertaken by the firm. We develop a model with two quasi—fixed
factors——the standard plant and equipment (P&E) capital and research and
development (R&D) capital. We are able to characterize the behavior of
investment over time and establish the existence, uniqueness and
stability of the long run equilibrium.
Financial and real decisions are interrelated in the sense that
the firm determines its debt—equity ratio, capital accnulation and
labor requirements by maximizing the initial share value. We thenestablish that this program is equivalent to finding the debt—equity
raLio which minimizes the cost of capital and labor requirements
which maximize net operating revenues. The firm then uses the maximized
net operating revenues and the minimized cost of capital to determine
the real investment demands and thereby its capital accumulation plans.
The growth of the capital stocks Is governed by the difference
between the marginal values of Installed to uninstalled capital. The
higher the marginal value of installed relative to uninstalled capital
the greater the demand for investment. The value of the marginal product
denotes the value of installed capital, while the marginal installation
costs and the cost of capital characterize the value of uninstalled
capital. The latter depends on the level of investment, the debt—equity
ratio, the interest and depreciation rates and the price of investment
products. The value of the maginal product, depends ,n the stocks of
the quasi—fixed factors, the relative price of the variable factors of
production and the product price.
Most studies on R&D treat it as a variable input in the production
process (see Nadiri [20] and Grlliches [11] and the references cited
Liierein).Recently,though, Nadirl and Bftros [21] developed a partial
cdjustment model with R&D and Schankerman and Nadiri [22] constructed
a model with R&D as the sole quasi—fixed factor. In this paper we
derive, from intertemporal maximization, and estimate investment demand
functions for two quasi—fixed factors, P&E and R&D capital. Moreover,
in none of these studies was the purpose to determine the influence
of alternative financing sources on capital accumulation.
2Empir .al evidence for the proposition that financial concerns
a fect R&D investment is mixed. There are only a few studies which have
examined the impact of the capital structure on R&D (see Elliot [6] and
Howe and McFetrldge [13].) However, in both of these studies an
intertemporal maximizing model of firmbehaviorwas not the basis for
the estimated equation and, in particular, for the hypothesized
relationship between capital stiucture and R&D.
Research examining the influences of financial behavior on
investment in plant and equipment has recently been undertaken by Engle
and Foley [7], Von Furstenberg [28], Von Furstenberg, Malkiel and
Watson [29] and Summers [24). These studies, relying to various
degrees on a dynamic model of the firm,haveshown that industry and
sectoral investment demand is significantly affected by changes in the
share market values.
.
Ourempirical results, based on a pooled time series, cross—
section sample of 49 firms, suggest that the debt—equity ratio exerts
a significant but small impact on P&E and R&D investment. In both
cases the effect is quite inelastic. In addition, for an increase in
the debt—equity ratio, the short—run response for both types of
investment are quite similar. As time evolves, however, the effect on
P&E becomes relatively stonger, with the long—run result that the
percentage decrease in P&E capital is substantially greater than for
R&D capital.
Tests were conducted to determine cross—section variations and
cross—equation correlations. We found that the disturbance terms for
the R&D and P&E investment functions were correlated. Moreover, there
3were interfirm differences in these equations. Interestingly, the
firms which exhibited distinct P&E investment demands were not the same
group with differences in R&D.investment. Therefore, the majority of
firms did not have an identical pair of P&E and R&D Investment demand.
functions.
In section 2 the model is developed, section 3 deals with the
short run equilibrium, while sectIon 4 pertains to the dynamics and the
long run equilibrium. The empirical work bgIns In section 5, with the
model implementation, and in section 6 we describe the data. Section 7
contains the econometric results and we then conclude.
2. The Model
To begin our analysis of the firm's investment and financing
decisions, we assume the technology is governed by
(1) y(t) =F[Kp(t)Kr(t)L(t))
45
where y(t) is output, F is the twice continuously differentiable
production function, with positive and diminishing marginal products;
K(t) is the stock of plant and equipment (P&E); K(t) is the stock of
research and development (R&D); L(t) is the labor services input. All
variables are evaluated in period t.
We assume that the services emanating from the capital stocks are
proportional to the stocks themselves.
The flow of funds of the firm is
(2) p(t)y(t) —w(t)L(t)—A[I(t)]—E[Ir(t)]
-rb(t)B(t)+B(t)+s(t)-D(t)=0
where p(t) is the output price; w Ct) is the wage rate; A is the twice
continuously differentiable trictly convex P&E ros"s investment cost
function with A(O) =A'(O)=0,A1 >0,A" >0for 1(t) >0;E is the
twice continuously differentiable R&D gross investment cost function with
E(0) =E'(0)=0,E' >0,E" >0for 1(t) >O;rb(t)is the interest
rate on corporate debt; B(t) is the change in the value of outstanding
debt, s(t) is the value of new sharesand D(t) are dividends.2
The firm accumulates P&E and R&D according to
(3) K =1 —6K,K(0)>0
p p pp
(4) K 1r —flKrK(0) >0
where 0 << 1,0 << 1,are the fixed depreciation rates for P&E and
R&D respectively.36
In the determination of share accumulation, we assume as in
Auerbach [2] and Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski [8] that the rate of
return on equity is dependent on the debt—equity ratio. The larger the
debt—equity ratio the higher the rate of return that the shareholders
require. We formulate this feature by
(5) r +H(v)=D/pN+pip,
where r is the net rate of return, H(v) is the premium required by
shareholders when the firm undertakes to issue bonds, where v =B/pN
and H' >0,H" >
Therate of return on shares is comprised of the dividends per
share plus (minus) any capital gains (losses). Let S =pN,so
S = + p14and by the definition ofswe must have s =p5Nthen
equation (5) can be rewritte as
(6) S =[r+H(v)]S —D+.
Thecorporate share value changes by the return on existing shares plus
any newshareissues minus any distributions to the shareholders.
Weassumethat the firmmaximizesthe initial value of equity,
which means that decisions are made in the interest of the shareholders.
The initial value is obtained by solving for S(0) from (6);
(7) S(0)fe rdu[D -H(v)S-s]dt.7
The initial share value equals the present value of the stream of
Hividends minus both the premium paid to shareholders when there is
outstanding' debt and any dilution from new share issues.
The program for the firm is obtained by maximizing the right side
of equation (7) subject to (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6). The Hamiltonian
for this problem is
(8) H =(1—
q4)[pF (K, K, L) —w L —Ad)—E(I)






where q1 to q4 are the shadow prices associated with the different
stocks of real and financial capital.
































There are, in addition toequations (3) and (4), the transversalityand
the Legendre—Clebsch (or second order) conditions.
Let us investigate the nature of the firm's intertemporal plan.
First, we can see that the determination of the real and financial
decisions are recursive. The debt—equity ratio is found from (9.4),
(9.7) and (9.8). This debt—equity ratio minimizes the cost of capital.
The firm then utilizes this cost of capital to determine the real
capital accumulation paths.




where q4 is the cost per dol,Jçar of equity, -q3 is te cost per
dollar of debt. From (9.2) (or (9.3)) 0 <
q4
<1.Thus the cost of
financing a dollar of real capital is divided between the debt and
equity instruments, since 1 =-q3
+
q4.




The adjusted rate of return on equity equals the interest rate on
corporate debt adjusted for the marginal premium needed in light of the
higher debt—equity ratio. Equation (10) is a single equation which can
be solved for one unknom, the debt—equity ratio. This debt—equity9
ratio minimizes the cost of capital. Define r(v) =[r+H(v)
•'•vrb]/




where r0 is the minimwn cost of capital. Substituting r° into the
definition of ,r yields equation (10) -Noticethat if rb and r are constant
then the debt-equity ratio isconstant for all time.
Second, the labor input decision given by (9.1) is devoid of any
intertemporal considerations. Since 1 —> 0,at each instant the
value of the marginal product is equal to the factor price. The
implication is that we can carry out our analysis in terms of operating
and capital decisions. First, the firmmaximizesnet operating
revenues, given the capital stocks and prices. This step yields a labor




The optimality condition to this program is given by equation (9.1).
The solution can be denoted as L =g(K, K, w/p).
Substituting the input demand function into the net operating
revenue equation, yields the indirect variable profits function
R(K, K, w /p) =pF(K, K, g(K, K, wlp)) —wg(K, Kr w/p).
Using the indirect variable profits function and the minimized cost of1-0











KI -flK r r r
We can summarize the firm's program in the following manner. First
it determines the labor requirements, conditional on the stocks of R&D
and P&E, by maximizing net operating revenues. Second, the debt—equity
decision is taken which miniiizes the costof .capitl. Finally, the.
real investment demands and the capital accumulation plans are deter-
mined (by using the maximized net operating revenues, the minimized cost
of capital) through maximizing the present value of the flow of funds
associated with the two types of real capital.
3. ihe Short—Run Equilibrium
The short—run equilibrium for the firm is denoted by equations
(9.1), (9.2) and (9.3). These equations are independent of each other
because labor does not involve any intertemporal considerations and the
investment costs oriy depend on their respective investment flow.
Consider the labor demand. If we assume that increases in the
stocks of P&E and R&D increase the marginal product of labor, then with11
diminishing marginal products, increases in the stocks increase labor
demand. In addition, an increase in the realwage decreases labor
requirements. Thus
(11) L =g(K,K, w/p);g1 >0, g2 >0,g3
0.
The short run investment demand functions for P&E and R&Dare given







Gross investment demand is forward looking and each one is an increasing
function of its respective demand price and a decreasing function of the
per dollar cost of financing the additions to the real capital stocks.
An alternative interpretation of equation sot (12) is that with the
price of uninstalled capital normalized to unity, 1 -qis the
marginal cost of uninstalled capital. Hence investment is an increasing
function of the marginal value of installed capital relative to the
marginal cost of uninstalled capital. Therefore gross investment isv.
determined by a mechanism similar to Tobin's [23 1(seealso Abel [ii




4. TheDynamicsand the Long—Run Equilibrium
In order to be able to characterize the dynamic behavior of the
firm and the long—run equilibrium, we must investigate equation set (9).First, equation (10) suxnina±jzes equations (9.4), (9.7) and (9.8). 12
Second, differentiating (9.2) and (9.3) with respect to time results in








substituting (9.2), (9.8), (10), and (11) and (14.1) into (9.5) provides
is with the differential equation for P&E investment
(14) A"(I) I =(rb
+H'(v)+6)A'(I)—
PF(KK, g(K, K, v/p)).
One interpretatio" 0Fequation(14) is that when the rtarainal return on
new capital, which is (rb +H'+cS)A',exceeds the marginal value of exist--
ing capital, which is PFIthengross investment increases such that Ii,> 0.
The converse holds when the marginal return on existing capital exceeds that
on new capital. Clearly, when the marginal returns are equal no additional
gross investment is undertaken.
Similarly we can determne the differential equation for R&D




PFr(1(p)Kr) g(K, K, vip)).
Noticethat since the debt-equity ratio is determined from (10) then the
remaining endogenous variables affecting the path of P&E investment is the
P&E investment flow andthetwo types of real capital.
ihe dynamic behavior of the firm can now be summarized into four
fqu:ions, (3), (4), (14) and (15). Let us first determine whether or
not there exists a unique long—run equilibrium. Suppose K =Kr
=0
then I =K,IK ,andso I =I 0. Thus at K =K=0,
p pr r p r p r
equations (14) and (15) become
(16) (rb +}i'(v)-ó)A'(K)=PF(K,Kr) g(K, K, w/p))
(17) (rb +H'(v)+n)E' (Kr) =
PFr(Kp)Kr) s(K Kr) w/p)).13
The long—run equilibrium levels of the real capital stocks are those
which simultaneously solve equations (16) and (17). Let us denote these
ee
values as (K ,K). rp
The immediate problem is to find the unique solution. To this end
we differentiate (16) and (17),
(F F -F F ) dK . prprU >0.
r p=0 EFPPFU —F
—(rb+H'+ )(A" ó FU/p)]
dK . EFrrF
—
F2—(rb + H' + )(Et' r F/p)]
(19) —p = >0.
rr (F — ) pr U
Hence in (Kr K) space equations (16) and (17) define direct
relationships between the real capital stocks which is illustrated in
Figure 1. Moreover, from (16) as K +0since A'(O) =0and by assuming
F(O, K, L)0 then the locus, defined by (16), in,tersects the
K —axis.From equation (17), as Kr +0since E'(O) =0and by
assuming Fr (K, 0, L) >0then the curve intersects the Kr —axis.
In order for there to exist a unique long—run equilibrium the
curves depicted in Figure 1 must intersect only once. A set of
sufficient conditions for this to occur are that
(20) F&_ F> FpFr•_ Fpr F i =' r.
If thmarginalproducts of each of the inputs diminish in sufficient
magnituie, then the above inequalities are satisfied. We then have
dK . dK <1, YK >1
r p=O r r=0













The stability of the long—run equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 2. Figure 2 is a four quadrant diagram which contains Figure 1
in the (K, K) space. The two remaining spaces to analyze are
(I, K) and (I, K).





The K =0locus is a straight line through the origin with the slope of
1/6 and above the line K <0,while below K >0.
p p
Next, from equation (14) at I =0,Kr =Keand with the conditions
defined by (20),
F(r +H'+is) dK . b = A<0.




Hence the I =0locus is negatively sloped. In addition, since
F(0, K, L) >0and at I =0,A'=
PF/(r
+H'+6)>0then the I 0
locus intersects the I —axis.To determine the movement when the firm
p





Therefore I >0for points above the I =0locus and I <0for points p p p




















I =O(Ke) r p.
I
c( 0
rcurves in (I, Kr) space and the behavior of the firm at any 1oint in
the space. From these results we can see that the long—run equilibrium
is a saddle point.6
5. The Empirical Implementation
The equations summarizing the dynamic behavior of the firm are
denoted by (3), (4), (14) and (15). We assume that (3) and (4) are
non—stochastic and use these equations to define the stocks of P&E and
R&D respectively. In order to carry out the estimation of equations
(14) and (15), we must specify the investment cost functions
E(I), the function denoting the premium on the rate of return to
shareholders, when debt financing is used, H(v), and the production
function F(K, K, L). We define
-
(23) MI) =pI [log I —logci ,I>c,u>0
(24) E(I) =rTr [log 'r —logd} 'r >a, >0
(25) H(v) =v[log v —loge] ,v>e ,y>0
(26) F(K ,K ,L) =AKX K L ,X>0,p >0, >0,
p,r pr
where p. i =p,r are the prices of the investment products for P&E and
R&D respectively.7
Substituting (23) to (26) into (14) and (15) yields
d(log I )




r= +y+ ylog v + ni(log1r 1PrKr
where a =a/c ,a2a1(1 —logc) '= /d ' = (1—log)
=y/ey = (1-loge) .7enow have twodifferential
equations in terms of the logarithms of the investment flows.The
solution to these equations depends on the timepaths of the debt-equity
ratio, the prices, the interest rate, output and thecapital stocks.
For simplicitly, as •in other dynamic models (see Morrisonand Berndt
[18]), we assume static expectations.8 Hence (27) and(28)are first
order, nonhomogenous differential equations in terms oflog I and
log 1withconstant coefficients.9 The solutions
(29) log 1(t) =log1e +[log1(0) —logIdJerb + 2+ slog v + )t
(30) log Ir(t) =log1c ÷ [log'r° —logIe]eb + 2+ log v + )t
where log 1e =
pK(rb + 1+ slog v + )
— and
log 1e =1PY. 2 The superscript erepresents r pK(r+ y+y1ogv+)-—---.. 1rr 2 1
the long—run equilibrium values.19
Time differentiating (29) and (30) and taking a discrete
approximation for each equation we find that
(31)log 1(t) =A+
A1log I(t—1) +A2log v(t).
+A log v (t) log I(t—1) +Ap(t)y(t)
3 p
(32)log 1(t) =B+
B1log Ir(t_1) +2log v(t)
+
B3log v (t)log1r (t -1)+
B4












From equations (31) and (32) we have established that investment (for
either P&E or R&D) in any period depends directly on its past value,
inversely on the financing costs (represented, in particular, by the
debt-equity ratio) and directly on the utilization of the existing
stock, as represented by the sales -to asset ratio.1'
6. The Data
Annual data on several variables were collected from a variety of
sources indicated below for the period 1959—1966 for forty—nine firms.
The selection of firms was dictated by the availability of consistent
time series data on R&D expenditures and the stock of R&D. The pooled
Lime—series cross section sample was designed to provide a richer set of
information in which to estimate the functions under consideration.20
Thelist of variables and their construction are: Plant and
equipment (K) is the measure of net stock generated by a perpetual
inventory formula
K(t) =1(t)+(1—6)K(t —1)
where 1(t) equals actual expenditures on plant and equipment deflated
by the price of investment in P&E. Investment in P&E and its associated
price (p) were obtained from the McGraw—Hill data series, with the
depreciation rate for each firm calculated by summing over time
depreciation allowances divided by the gross plant and equipment and
then dividing this sum by the number of time periods. The stock of
R&D (Kr) was obtained from a similar procedure,
K(t)rr(t) ÷ (1n)K(t
Investmentin R&D (I) and its associated price (p) were obtained from
McGraw—Hilldata series and we arbitrarily chose rj =.1to measure the
depreciation rate for the stock of knowledge. Debt (B) was obtained
from Standard and Poor's data series for long term corporate debt.
Equity (S) was also obtained from Standard and Poor's series for the
closing common share price multiplied by the number of outstanding
common shares. Sales (py) figures were obtained from the Nc—Graw Hill
data series.
7. TheEmpiricalResults
In order to render equations (31) and (32) stochastic, we add a
random disturbance termtoeach equation. Moreover, to reflect the factthat the equations can vary among the firms in the sample, because of
technological differences, we add to A and B parameters which are 0 0
firm—specific. Thus (31) and(32)become,
(33) log I(j,t) =A(j)+ A1 log I(j,t—l) + A2 logv(j,t)
+ A3 log v(j,t) log I(j,t-l)
+ A4p(j,t)K(j,t-l)+ u(j,t)
(34) log I(j,t) =B(j)+ B1 log Ir(Jt_l) + B2 log v(j,t)
+ B3 log v(j,t) log 'r (j,t—l)
+B4 +(j,t)
j —l,...,49 + T =l960,...,19E4.
We initially make the following assumptions on the disturbance terms:
The joint distribution of u =[u.(1, 1960),... u.(49, 1964)]is multi—
variate normal, E[u.] =0,E[u.u] =o..Ifor i p,r and E[u Ut] =0 1 11 ii pr
where is the variance of the disturbance terms, I is the identify
1].
matrixand0 is the zero matrix.
21The estimation results for P&E investment are presented in Table
1. In this estimation we have assumed that a0(j) =a0(k),b0(j) =b0(k)
for j,k =1,...,49. Initially we impose the restriction that the
equations are identical across firms. In Table 1 there are two sets
of estimates. The first row refers to the results from estimating
equation (33) and the second row refers to a restricted version with
a2, which implies that c =1in equation (23), and so A2 =
A3
in
equation (33). We see that all estimates have the correct sign and
the equation fits the data quite well. In addition, from the
unrestricted equation, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that
A2 =A3.Thus, imposing the restriction we see from the second row
that all estimates are significant. In particular, increases in the
debt—equity ratio do indeed decrease P&E investment.
Due to the presence of the interaction between agged investment
and the debt—equity ratio the elasticity varies over the sample. The





and for the long—run elasticity
slog K (j,t)
(36) e . = A[1 + log K (j,t)]/(1 —
pvlog v(J,t) 2 p 1
—
A2log v(j,t) +A4w(j,t)')
where w(j,t)p(j,t)y(j,t)/p(j,t)K(j,t). The long—runelasticity
idefinedfor K =0,and thereby I =Kand I =0.The mean



































































































































































































































































































































 value of the short—term elasticity is -.028,while the mean value in
the long run is —.193. Thus, in the short run an increase in the
debt—equity ratio of 1% leads to a decrease in P&E investment by .028%,
while in the long run an increase of 1% leads to a decrease in the P&E
capital stock by —.193%.As expected, the long—run elasticity exceeds
the short—run. Moreover, both effects are inelastic, with the short—run
highly inelastic, but nevertheless significant.
Turning to the results for R&D investment, we see from Table 2
that the estimation of the restricted version of equation (34) elicits
significant coefficients with the correct sign. Once again the fit is
quite strong. An interesting feature is that changes in the debt—equity
ratio do indeed exert a significant impact on R&D investment. The
short—run elasticity is
slog I(j,t)
e= . = B(1 + log I (jt
—1))
rvslog v(j,t) 2 r




B2[1+ log K(j,t)]/1 —B1
—
B2log v(j,t) +B4z(j,t))
where z(j,t) The mean value for the
short run is —.017 and for the long run the mean value is —.0985. Once
again the short—run effect is less than the long—run. In addition, the
influence of changes in the debt—equity ratio is substantially smaller



























































































































































































































































































































 impact of a percentage Increase In the debt—equity ratio causes the
percentage decrease in P&E investment to be approximately 65% greater
than the percentage decrease in R&D investment. As time passes, the
spread in percentage changes enlarges, such that in the long run the
mean value of P&E capital elasticity with respect to the debt—equity
ratio is approximately double the R&D capital elasticity.
Differences in investment demand functions among firms can arise
through the different production technologies. In order to account for
any cross section variations, we drop the assumption that the intercepts
in equations (33) and (34) are the same for all firms. In our sample
the 49 firms are classified into 10 different 2—digit SIC groupings.
Hence we introduce 9 binary variables into the regression equations.
The 10 different firm groupings are represented as 10 different
equations, for each investmentcategory,'with the èqution differences
reflected through the binary variable coefficients.
The single equation estimates of this covariance model for the
restricted version of the P&E investment equation are presented in
Table 3. We find that the nonbinary variable coefficients have the
correct sign, they are significant and the fit is good. The coefficient
on the debt—equity ratio is —.005 as opposed to —.008 as found in Table
1. Thus, the mean value of the short—run elasticity is now —.017 and
the mean value for the long—run is —.103.The introduction of cross
section variations in P&E investment has caused the effects emanating
from changes in the debt—equity ratio to become weaker. This occurs
in the short and long runs with the short—run elasticity falling by 40%
andthe long—run decreasing by roughly 47%.
26Table 3
Single Equation Covariance Model OLS Estimation






B A0 (.380) (—.278) 0
A .858 .904
B 1 (22.221) (26.915) 1
—.005 —.006
A2 (—2.635) (—2.572) B2
.555 .022










d (;188) (—.616) r5
—.153 .357
d6 (—.806) (1.822) d6
—.389 —.082
d d7 (1579) (.—.324) r7
.104 .750 d8 (.403) (2.684) d8
.071 —.336
d9 (.184) (—.814) d9
R2 .813 .847 R2
SEE .784 .832 SEE
27With respect to the interfirm differences we see that there is
a suggestion of cross section variation arising from groups 3, 4 and 8
represented respectively by the binary variables d2, d3 and d4.
Table 3 also shows the restricted R&D Investment demand estimation.
The fit, signs, significance and values of the nonbinary variable
coefficients is similar to those found in Table 2. In addition, unlike
the case for P&E the mean value of the short—run elasticity has not
changed, it is still —.017. The mean value of the long—run elasticity
Is now —.06. Therefore, we find that the long—run effect of a change
In the debt—equity ratio, as for P&E, has significantly decreased with
the introduction of cross section differences. Interestingly, a 1%
increase in the debt—equity ratio causes the same decrease, in the
short run, for P&E and R&D investment. However, as time evolves the
effect on P&E capital increases relative to the effect on R&D capital,
such that in the long run the debt—equity elasticity of P&E is 72%
larger than for R&D.
The binary variables also illustrate that groups 5, 7 and 9
(as represented by d4, d6 and d8) exhibit technological differences
such that their R&D investment demand equations are distinct from the
cross section average.. In fact, with group 9 d8 =.750,and therefoe
the distinct technology for this group causes the intercept in its
R&D equation to be —.049 + .750.701, which is significantly above
the average value of —.049.
We have proceeded in the estimation as if the P&E and R&D
investment equations are independent of each other. However, as they
are both derived from the same dynamic program characterizing firm
28behavior, it seems reasonable to expect some stochastic relationship to
be present between the equations. Thus, we drop the assumption that
EEu ut] =0and now assume that E[u u] =aI, where ais the pr pr pr pr
covariance between the disturbance terms of the two investment equations.
Equations (33) and (34) are now seemingly unrelated regression
equations and are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood to account for
the cross equation correlation among the disturbance terms. We also
include the binary variables to account for the cross section
differences within each equation. The estimates are presented in
Table 4.
The effect of changes in the debt—equity ratio on P&E investment
in the short run is the same as when the equations were estimated
separately, that is, —.017. However, the mean value of the long—run
elasticities is now —.088. Ths shows a significant decline in the
long—run magnitude from the single equation estimate of —.103. The
effects on R&D do not change when joint estimation is undertaken. The
short— and long—run elasticities are, respectively, —.017 and —.06.
Therefore, we can summarize our findings on the debt—equity effects
in the following way. An increase in tb ratio initially causes the
same response on P&E and R&D investment. As time passes, though, the
P&E effect becomes relatively larger, and indeed in the long run the
effect is about 47% greater for P&E compared to R&D capital. Nevertheless,
for both types of capital the effects, both short— and long—run, are
highly inelastic.
In the context of joint estimation, cross section variations have
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0 (1.515) (.043) B0
A .809 .872
1 (22.354) (27.646) B1
A —.005 —.006
2 (—2.605) (—2.968) B2
.427 .020




p2 (1.904) (1.636) d2
.524 .032
d (2.013) (.122) r3
d .487 .706
d p4 (1.293) (1.774) r4
—.028 —.188
d5 (-.130) (—.847) d5
—.223 .361
d 4p6 (—1.209) (1.893) r6
—.485 —.082
d d7 (—2.027) (—.355) r7
.147 .817
d d8 (.169) (3.010) r8
d .063 —.270
















313, 4 and 8 exhibit differences from the cross section average.
Groupings 3 and 4 invest in P&E more than the average. Indeed, the
intercept term for group 3 is more than twice as large as the average.
The investment for group 8 is smaller, with an intercept of —.189
compared to the average of .296.
R&D investment shows interfirm differences. As observed in single
equation estimates, group 9 invests in R&D substantially more than the
average. Now we also find a tendency for groups 5 and 7 to significantly
vary from the average, with theirR&D investment levels larger. A
final interesting result is that, not only are there cross section
differences, but the firms that have different P&E investment demand
functions are not those which have difference R&D investment demand
functions. Taken together, the package of P&E and R&D equations for
each grouping appears to be qu'ite
8, Conclusion
In this paper we developed a dynamic model of firm behavior which
integrates real and financial decisions. The firm, at each instant,
determines its labor requirements, the debt—equity ratio and the real
investment demands for plant and equipment and research and development.
Although the firm determines these elements simultaneously by maximizirg
the initial value of equity, in effect the decision process is
sequential. The debt—equity ratio is found by minimizing the cost of
capital and the labor input emanates from the maximization of net
operating revenues. Gathering these two parts permits us to
characterize the accumt1ation of the real capital stocks.
32The estimated equations derived from the theoretical model have
the property that investment demand depends on the lagged Investment
flow, the cost of additional capital (as reflected by the debt—equity
ratio), and the utilization of the existing capital stock as measured
by the sales to asset ratio for each particular type of real capital.
The equations were estimated to account for the statistically
significant cross equation and cross section differences. For both P&E
andR&Dthe debt—equity ratio significantly affects the investment
demands and the elasticities are highly inelastic. In addition, the
effect is stronger for P&E than for R&D capital in the long run, while
the effects on P&E and R&D investment are quite similar in the short
run.The impact of a percentage Increase in the debt—equity ratio causes
the percentage decline in P&E capital to be approximately one and one
half times the percentage decrase in R&D.
33Footnotes
1. We can view P&E investment costs as reflecting a constant
price, p. and installation costs. The latter are represented by
C(I)
which is increasing and strictly convex. Thus, A(I)
pI + C(I).
Following the discussion of Mussa [19] the installation costs are
internal, although separable from the capital stocks and labor.
2. We assume that the lending and borrowing interest rates on
corporate debt are identical. In addition, we assume that there is
only one type of bond and share.
3. Henceforth we drop the symbol (t) for notational convenience.
4. The function 11(v) summarizes, in a simple way, the
bankruptcy costs resulting from the firm's choiceof a debt—equity
ratio. See Gordon [9] and Linner [16].
'-
5.We assume that F>0,so that now all cross partial
pr
derivatives are positive.
6. We cannot illustrate the dynamic path of the firm because the
I =0locus depends on I ,Kand K ,whilethe I 0 locus depends
p pp r r
on I ,Kand K rp r
7. The functions satisfy the properties needed in the
specification of the model. The production function is a first order
logarithmic approximation to any arbitrary production function and we
do not restrict the degree of returns to scale.
8. An alternative would be to use equation set (12) which





q4.These-are the shadow pricesdefining Tobin's q's for
34each type uf capital. However, in order to obtain observable variables
or the shadow prices, the share value of the firm (S) must be
homogeneous of degree 1 in the capital stocks, labor services and the
investment flows (see 1-Iayashi [12] and Summers [24]). This implies
that the technology must exhibit constant returns to scale, unit
adjustment costs are homogeneous of degree 0 in the respective
investment flow and capital stock, and the debt to asset ratio is fixed.
Clearly, at the firm level, the assumption of constant returns to scale
is quite restrictive. In addition, the fixed debt—asset ratio abstracts
from the financing decision and its influence on capital accumulation,
which we are attempting to test.
9. The static expectations assumption yields investment
equations which are of the accelerator variety. In our context the
accelerator is in terms of the'logarithmsof investmett. For the
[27] theoretical development of the accelerator model see Treadway
and for empirical surveys see Eisner [5] and Jorgenson [14].
10. We are treating (rb + 5 + y) and (rb + ri + y) as parameters.
This seems reasonable given that the terms do not vary over the firms,
and 5, r and y do not vary over time. In addition, rb is relatively
constant over this period.
11. In the "q" approach to estimating investment functions It
has been found that investment is related to the lagged value of q
rather than to the contemporaneous value (see Summers [24]). This
result is not predicted by the theory and indeed may be quite
troublesome. The reason is that by relating investment to the lagged
value of theratioof the shadow prices of installed to uninstalled
35capital involves an assumption concerning the firm's expectations, which
is not explicitly accounted for in the theory.
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